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UNIFORMITY RUN RIOT-EXTENSIONS OF THE ERIE
CASE
LAWRENCE EARL BROH-KAHN*

In a former article,1 we considered the fundamental tenet

of the Erie case 2 as a constitutional decision and concluded that
it was unsound, both nstorically and as a question of jurisprudence. The purpose of tins article is to consider certain extensions of the doctrine of the Erw case in the light of those conclusions.
For two years after the decision of the Ere case, no case
was presented to the Supreme Court which either involved or
required an extension of the principle of that decision. But in
the course of 1940 and 1941, at least seven cases 3 reached the
Supreme Court wich were decided on the basis of that case. All
involved an extension of its doctrine and therefore necessarily
resulted in its broader application.
The seven cases readily group themselves into three distinct
types or classes, and may be discussed separately by group. In
one group of cases, 4 the question presented was whether the fed*A.B., 1924, and A.M., 1926, University of Cincinnati; LL.B.,
1936, Harvard. Associated with the law firm of Jones, Day, Cockley
& Reavis, Cleveland, Ohio. Admitted to practice in the Ohio
Supreme Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
and the United States Supreme Court. Author of Accrual of the General 1Property Tax zn Ohio, 15 U. of Cin. L. Rev 359.
Amendment by Decisons-More on the Erie Case (1941) 30
Ky. Law Journal 3.
3'Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169 (1940), Six
Companies v. The Joint Highway District No. 13, 311 U. S. 180
(1940), West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U. S. 223
(1940), Stoner v. New York Life Insurance Co., 311 U. S. 464 (1940).
Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U. S. 538 (1941), Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941), Griffin v.
McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941).
'Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169 (1940), Six
Companies v The Joint Highway District No. 13, 311 U. S. 180
(1940), West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U. S. 223
(1940); Stoner v. New York Life Insurance Co., 311 U. S. 464 (1940).
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eral courts must, under the Erie decision, follow the common
law or statutory decisions of intermediate and nssz prms courts of
6
5
The second group
the state in which the federal court sits.
turns on the question whether decisions of the state courts on
matters of conflict of laws are the law of the state and rules of
decision within the Eris case and the Rules of Decision Act. The
Court held that they were and consequently that they were
binding on the federal courts. In still a third group involving
a single case, the Court held that the decision of a federal court
in a diversity of citizenship case must conform to the decisions
of the state courts at the tine the federal decision is rendered.
In other words, though the federal courts follow the law of the
state as expressed in the decisions of its courts, if that law should
change as the result of the overruling of earlier decisions, pending an appeal or at any time while the federal judgment is still
sub 3udice, the federal court must change its decision to conform
to the state law as newly announced. 8
If the decision in the Erie case be unsound, then the foundation of the decisions which extend its principle likewise collapses,
and there would be little occasion to consider the later cases any
further. But, as we observed in the former article, the actual
decision or result in the Erse case can perhaps be justified on
statutory grounds. Also, as we observed in that article, the
decision can perhaps be justified on grounds of judicial policy
alone, 9 apart from any requirements of the Constitution or statutes. The underlying theory of the Erie case is that litigants
5

In the Erie case, Mr. Justice Brandeis said, 304 U. S. at 78:
* and whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision, is not a matter
of federal concern." (Italics supplied.) From this statement it was
generally assumed that the doctrine of the Erie case applied only to
decisions of the state's highest tribunal.
'Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941),
Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941).
'Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U. S. 538 (1941)
'Reference should perhaps be made to still a fourth class, involving suits in equity. Russell v. Todd, 309 U. S. 280 (1940), Ruhlin v.
Although the
New York Life Insurance Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938)
Court pointed out that the Rules of Decision Act does not apply to
suits in equity, the Court held that the principle of the Erie case
governs such suits. In this respect, however, the Erie case effected
no change with respect to suits in equity since prior to that
case the Court had held that in equity cases the Federal court should
follow the state law Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545 (1923)
'See article in 30 Ky. Law Journal 3 and next preceding note.
"* *
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should not enjoy the benefits and suffer the burdens of decisions
that differ from those of the state courts merely because one of
the litigants happens to be a non-resident of the state where the
federal court sits. And any judicial policy winch eliminates this
disparity of decision and apparent injustice must be deemed
sound at this time, even though it runs contrary to the ostensible
purpose of the framers of the Constitution and the federal
judiciary
The Erie decision is, therefore, sound in principle. But does
it follow that its extensions are equally sound? This question
can best be answered by a review of those cases and the three
classes into which they fall.
LowER A .'D INTERMEDIATE STATE COURT DECISIONS

In West v. Amertca TeZephone & Telegraph Co.1 ° the
court held that federal courts sitting in Ohio are bound to follow
the law of the State of Ohio as enunciated by a decision of one of
the Courts of Appeals of Ohio. The Circuit Court of Appeals
had declined to follow the decision of an Ohio intermediate appellate court on the ground that the decision was based upon an
erroneous interpretation and application of one of its own former
decisions in which the writer of the opinion in the West case had
handed down the opinion of the court. The Supreme Court held
that the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals was binding on
the Circuit Court of Appeals and that it represented the law of
Ohio in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary
In order to grasp the import of the West case and to assign
it a proper place in the development of the doctrine of the Erie
case, it is necessary to consider the effect of a decision of an Ohio
Court of Appeals.
Ohio is divided into nine appellate districts, in each of which
a court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction, either mediate or
intermediate, over all inferior courts of record in the district,
such as the Common Pleas Courts, the Probate Courts, and the
Municipal Courts. It has no appellate jurisdiction or supervisory power over the inferior courts of any.other appellate district.
Its decisions need not be, and often are not, followed by the inferior courts of other appellate districts. They are not binding

0 Notes

3 and 4, supra.
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upon the courts of appeals of other appellate districts. And
they are reviewable by the -Supreme Court of Ohio. They are
final only to the extent that decisions of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals are final. That is to say, they are reviewable by the
Supreme Court of Ohio only as a matter of grace and privilege
and not as a matter of right.i1 If the decisions of the courts of
appeals of two appellate districts are in direct conflict, they may
be certified to the Ohio Supreme Court, and thus may be said to
be entitled to review as of right in the particular instance. 2
When the status of these intermediate courts and the effect
of their judgments are borne m mind, it at once becomes apparent that the import of the West case is not to apply or follow
the principle of the Erie case but, in fact, to distort it. The Erie
case places the federal courts on a par with the state courts in
matters of state law. It requires federal courts to render the
same decisions in cases involving non-residents that the state
courts would render in the case of residents. It means that in
A v B, one or both of whom are non-residents of Olho, the federal
court will render precisely the same judgment as the Supreme
Court of Ohio has already rendered in the case of X v. Y, both
residents of Ohio, on a parallel state of facts.
The West case, on the other hand, renders the federal courts
subordinate to the intermediate state appellate courts and places
the federal litigant at a distinct disadvantage ms-a-wns the state
court litigants. The theory of the decision is, first, that the federal court is bound by the state law in so far as it can be ascertained from decisions of the intermediate appellate courts of the
state, and, second, that it must follow those decisions in the absence of convincing evidence that they do not represent the law
of the state.
But when resident litigants appear before an intermediate
appellate court, they are not faced with the necessity of these
dual duties with respect to the decisions of other intermediate
11The Supreme Court of Ohio has constitutional jurisdiction to
review decisions of the intermediate appellate courts in matters of
public and great general interest. The looseness and ambiguity of
the term "public and great general interest" render the right of
review uncertain and of indefinite and unlimited extent, depending
largely upon the manner in which the question is presented and the
attitude of the Court at the time of presentation.
" The Supreme Court of Oio has certain other limited obligatory
jurisdiction which is rarely exercised.
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appellate courts of the same state. Let us say, e. g., that in the
case of A v. B, the court of appeals of the sixth Olo appellate
district has decided that x=y Does the court of appeals of the
seventh appellate district regard that decision as either the law
of Ohio or as binding upon it 9 The answer to this query is a
most emphatic negative. It never occurs to litigants (and would
be most emphatically repudiated by the court, if it did) to refer
to the decision of the sixth appellate court as the law of Ohio.
Nor will it be cited as binding upon the seventh appellate court.
To be sure, litigants will refer to the decision as persuasive and
as right or wrong. And the court will treat the decision with
the respect due the decision of any court of equal and coordinate jurisdiction. But the question paramount in the mind of
the court is and always will be whether the decision is right or
wrong, sound or unsound. 13 It has no more influence or persuasive effect than a decision of an English court or a court of
another state.
And this is true also of even inferior courts within the
seventh district. They are no more bound by nor will they give
any more deference to a decision of the sixth appellate court
than they will to decisions of inferior courts in the seventh district or to the decisions of the courts of other jurisdictions. In
fact, the court of one district will occasionally deliberately reject
a decision of the court of appeals of another district simply because it dislikes it and feels that if the law were as pronounced
by that decision, it should be changed. Or the court of appeals
of one district may render an adverse decisio in order to certify
its own decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio and thereby
obtain a pronouncement as to what the law of Ohio really is.
The whole matter may perhaps be stated colloquially in this
manner When a non-resident goes into the federal court, either
voluntarily or by compulsion, and is confronted by an adverse
'It is an open secret in Ohio that the Supreme Court rarely, if
ever, relies upon or even gives deference to the opinions and decisions
of intermediate appellate courts. Members of the Bar, in seeking to
obtain review of the decisions of such courts or m seeking to con-

vince the Supreme Court of the rectitude of their cause once they

have obtained review, sedulously avoid the citation of intermediate
appellate court opinions in their briefs as well as arguments before
the Court. It is, therefore, more than passing strange that the federal courts should be required to abide by decisions of courts which
the state's highest court completely ignores and to which it does not
even give persuasive, to say nothing of binding, effect.
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decision (of which he may not even have any knowledge at the
time) of an intermediate appellate court of the state whose law
is controlling, he has, under the doctrine of the West case, two
and three quarters strikes against him. When a resident appears before a coordinate intermediate appellate court or even
lower court of the same state under similar circumstances, he
does so with a clean record and with no strikes against him. If
the decision of the other appellate court is favorable to him,
perhaps it may be said he has one ball called on him-a very
trivial advantage.
Thus, far from placing the resident and non-resident, the
federal and state courts, on a par, as the Erie case contemplates,
the West case actually places the non-resident and the federal
court in a distinctly inferior position vs-a-vis residents and the
state courts. 14 The resident argues to the seventh appellate court
what its decision should be, irrespective of decisions in another
appellate district. But the non-resident in the federal court must
accept the decision of a single intermediate appellate court as
the law of Ohio, in the absence of strong evidence that the decision does not represent that law.15 And where is the federal
" In the Field case, 311 U. S. at 180, the Court said: "It is mad-

missible that there should be one rule of state law for litigants

in

the

state courts and another rule for litigants who bring the same question before federal courts owing to the circumstances of diversity
of citizenship."
I An excellent illustration of the result of the rule in the West
case can be seen in a recent Ohio decision involving the effect of a
widow's election under the law on her right to intestate property as
an heir of her deceased husband. In 1927 the Court of Appeals of
one district, in Zizelman v Mayer, 27 0. App. 512 (Cuyahoga App.),
held that in electing against the will the widow was barred from inheriting as heir. This was the sole decision in Ohio bearing upon
that question which, apparently, did not arise again until 1940. During the interim, if the question had been presented in the federal
courts of Ohio, they would have been bound by the Zizelman decision, although it is apparent from a reading of the opinion that the
case was not well argued and that the point was not thoroughly considered by the Court.
In 1940 the question arose again in the courts of Ohio where the
litigants were not bound by a decision of a Court of Appeals of another district, even though of some thirteen years' standing. In
Goodfellow v. Wilson, 32 Ohio Law Abs. (Clark App., 1940) the
Court of Appeals of another appellate district refused to follow the
Zizelman case, decided that the rule there enunciated was erroneous
and certified the decision in the Goodfellow case to the Supreme
Court. The case was settled and dismissed by the parties before the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to pass upon the question. What
is the law of Ohio under these circumstances? It may be that if the
Supreme Court had passed upon the question it would have affirmed
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court to find such evidence 9 Obviously, none exists, or the intermediate appellate court would not have rendered the decision
it did.
The StonerIG and Six Companes17 cases merely present variations of the facts and decision m the West case. The Stoner
case is practically identical to the West case, in that in both cases
the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts involved the
same parties as those who sought to have their rights determined in the federal courts.is And in both cases, the state
supreme courts had refused to review the decisions of the intermediate appellate courts !19 The latter feature was also present
in the Six Companies case ;20 but the former feature was absent.
Not only were the parties in the federal and intermediate appellate court cases not the same, but the question at issue arose
differently in the two cases. In the state court case, the building
contractor sought to offset a clan for liquidated damages provided by the contract against the owner's right to damages for
abandonment of the contract without cause, whereas, in the Six
Companies case, the owner claimed liquidated damages in addition to damages for breach of contract in the abandonment of
construction.
These similarities and minor variations in the three cases
were, however, regarded as Immaterial by the Supreme Court.
All three cases were decided upon the basic principle that in
diversity of citizenship cases federal courts must follow the
decisions of intermediate appellate courts of the state whose law
is applicable m the absence of convincing evidence that those
decisions do not represent the applicable law of the state. And
the Goodfellow decision, in which case federal decisions following
the Zizelman case during the thirteen-year interim would have been
palpably erroneous and prejudicial to the rights of the litigants in
the federal forum.

"Notes 3 and 4, supra.
Notes 3 and 4, supra.
The Court did not regard this fact as involving the application

of the doctrine of res adjudicata. Professor Corbin points out, however, that this fact made the issues in the federal court on the question of state law res adjudicata, without any regard whatever to the
rank of the state court that decided them or the laws of the several
states. The Laws of the Several States (1941) 50 Yale Law Journal
762, 770.
The demal of a motion to certify or right of appeal in Ohio

constitutes no affirmance or approval of the decision of the lower
court; nor does it establish a precedent.
"See next preceding note.
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the ratw decidendi of the three decisions is that "It is inadmissible that there should be one rule of state law for litigants in the
state courts and another rule for litigants who bring the same
question before the federal courts owing to the circumstance of
diversity of citizenship. "21
As pointed out above in the discussion of the West case, the
purpose of the decisions is thwarted at the outset by the very
nature of the structure and jurisdictional limitations of the
state intermediate appellate courts. The effect of the decisions
is the direct opposite of the avowed purpose of the Supreme
Court in deciding them. Non-residents, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily in the federal court because of diversity of citizenship, are placed at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis residents in
the state courts, and the federal courts themselves are summarily
subordinated to the decisions of intermediate state appellate
courts. They are bound by decisions of the latter, although litigants in the state courts and the courts themselves of other appellate districts are compelled to give them no such binding effect.
In other words, within the state, a decision of one of its intermediate appellate courts, except within its own appellate district, has no binding effect whatever. In the federal courts, that
decision is, for all practical purposes, the law of the state which
the federal court must follow. This is stretching the doctrine of
the Erie case to unreasonable limits, and undoubtedly goes far
22
beyond what the writer of the opinion in that case intended.
If these three decisions are out of harmony and in conflict
with the avowed purpose and intent of the Erie case, the case of
Fideiity Union Trust Co. v Field23 is an even more striking
illustration of what can happen once a court embarks upon a
course of judicial legislation or what we have called in the former
article Constitutional Amendment by Decision. In that case, the
Supreme Court held that the federal courts must follow the decision of a vice-chancellor in a nss prius court in New Jersey,
whose decisions are reviewable by the highest court of that state,
not as a matter of privilege, as in the decisions involved in the
West, Stoner and Six Companies cases, but as a matter of right.
The case involved the application of a New Jersey statute to a
- 311 U. S. at 180.
2See
3 See

note 5, supra.
Notes 3 and 4, supra.
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savings bank trust. The vice-chancellor had held that the statute was confused and ambiguous and did not change the common
law of the state which demed validity to such "trusts."
As a
majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Field case
pointed out, the construction of the statute by the vice chancellor was plainly erroneous and was not the law of New Jersey
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the vice-chancellor's
decision was binding on the federal court, even though it obviously frustrated the purpose of the legislature in attempting
to change the common law and nullified the statute, and even
though it had no similar binding effect upon other courts in New
Jersey
OVERRuLING DEcIsION

A still more shocking illustration of the extent to which the
Court has carried the rule of the Erie ease is furnished by the
decision in Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. 24 The Court
there held that when the highest court of a state, pending an
appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, overrules earlier decisions upon which the District Court has relied in rendering a
judgment that was concededly correct at the time of entry, the
appellate court must reverse the judgment and conform its decision to the subsequent state decision or state law at the tune of
the entry of the judgment on appeal. The vice of this decision
is not, so much as in the other cases, that it places non-residents
"See Notes 3 and 7, supra. It was strenuously urged upon the
Court in this case that the Erie case was not a constitutional decision
but a statutory decision or perhaps merely one of general judicial

policy and that as the mandate of the Rules of Decision Act did not

in express terms apply to appeals but only to trials at common law,

the case should be decided independently of either the Erie case or the
Rules of Decision Act. The Court in its opinion does not allude to
the constitutional issue; and in fact the opinion was written by Mr.
Justice Reed, who merely concurred in the judgment in the Erie case

and in fact dissented from the constitutional decision. Query* has
the court in this manner abandoned the constitutional decision in the
Erie case? See 'remarks of Professor Cook on this point. Federal
Courts and the Conflict of Laws (1942) II1. L. Rev. 493, 521 et seq.
The Vandenbark case is confusing in that in one place, 311 U. S.
at 540, the Court says: "There is nothing in the Rules of Decision
section to point the way to a solution," whereas at the end of the
opinion, 311 U. S. at 543, the Court apparently rests the decision

squarely upon the Rules of Decision Act, saying, "the duty rests
upon federal courts to apply state law under the Rules of Decision
statute in accordance with the then controlling decision of the highest state court."
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in the federal courts at a disadvantage in not affording them the
opportunities which litigants in the state courts have, although
the decision does have that effect. Its principal vice lies in completely subordinating the federal courts to the state courts,
rather than placing them on a par with the latter in accord with
the spirit and obvious intent of the Erie case.
The first of these defects of the decision can be illustrated in
the following manner. At the time the District Court enters judgment, the applicable state law, as announced by the highest court
of the state, is that x=y While the federal cause is pending on
appeal in the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of the
state overrules its earlier decisions, and the pertinent state law
thereby becomes x=z. If the parties to the suit in the federal
court were litigants in the state courts, they would, at least theoretically, have an opportunity to pursue the matter to the state's
highest court and to contend and perhaps convince the court
that the pertinent law was not x~z but x-y In other words,
the opportunity is afforded to them to question the soundness of
the overruling decision and urge upon the court a reversion to
its former view.
To be sure, this opportunity, which litigants in the state
courts possess, might not prove a very valuable asset, inasmuch
as the state court is not apt, within the course of time occupied
by an appeal, to overrule a decision in which it has but recently
overruled earlier decisions.2 5 But the very history of decision
indicates that such action on the part of courts is not a nonexistent figment of the imagination. If a court can overrule its
decisions once, it can likewise overrule the overruling decision
and revert to its former decisions. 26 But the Vandenbark case
'Under the West and kindred decisions, note 4, supra, litigants
in the state courts would have ample opportunity to obtain in higher
state courts a review of right or at least of grace of the decisions by
which litigants in the federal courts are bound. Nevertheless, under
those cases this right is denied to litigants in the federal courts.
It should also be observed that under the West and kindred
decisions the rule of the Vandenbark case should likewise apply to
decisions of state intermediate appellate and even ntst prius courts
which overrule their own earlier decisions.
I Many overruling decisions are the result of elections and a
change in the personnel of the court. This was true of the Ohio
decision which the Supreme Court of the United States held required
the reversal of the judgment in the Vandenbark case. And it may
be that another election and change in personnel of the court will
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forecloses all inquiry in the federal courts into the soundness or
stability of the overruling state decision. And the mere fact
that litigants in the state courts possess the opportunity to attack
the overruling decision should have given the Supreme Court
pause before depriving them of this right in the federal courts.
Even though the possession of this opportunity might not warrant very sanguine expectations as to the outcome of such an
atttack, the opportunity is a substantial right which should not
be disregarded.
More serious even than its vice in thus placing federal litigants at a disadvantage is-a-vms those in the state courts is the
fact that the Vandenbark case ignores the dual nature of our
judicial system and the constitutional independence of the federal courts. It subordinates the federal courts to the courts of the
state in matters of state law. It makes the federal court the football of every passing fancy of the state courts which may result
in the overruling of established precedents pending an appeal.
It enlarges the scope of the Rules of Decision Act and gives it an
effect which was probably not within the intent of the framers
of that act.
The state supreme court has determined that the law of the
state on a certain set of facts is that x=y When the federal district court entertains an action involving sinilar facts, it must,
under the Rules of Decision Act, decide that x=y and render
cause the Ohio court to revert to the rule of the decisions which it

overruled when the Vandenbark case was pending on appeal.
A particularly striking illustration of the instability of decisions
is furnished by the early case of Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Sanderson, 6 At. 453 (Pa., 1886). The case involved injury to the
plaintiff resulting from pollution of a'stream in the process of coal
mining. The question was whether the defendant was liable in the
absence of negligence. The case was twice appealed to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania which affirmed the judgment of the trial court
awarding damages to the plaintiff. On both appeals the case was
thoroughly argued and the court held that the defendant was liable
without a showing of negligence. The first trial and the first appeal
occurred in 1878. Dissatisfied with the second appeal the plaintiff
brought a second writ of error involving the measure of damages
and the judgment was reversed for a third trial, which was held in
1885. On judgment for the plaintiff the case was again appealed.
In the interim the court had suffered a change of personnel. On
the third appeal the court overruled its two earlier decisions and
held that the defendant was not liable without a showing of negligence. See also the amazing background and judicial acrobatics in
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U. S. 4
(1940) and Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287

U. S.358 (1932).
L.J.-2
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judgment accordingly It has no choice in the matter since the
enactment of that act and its construction in the Erie case. Subsequently, when the cause is pending on appeal, whether in the
Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the state court
decides that x=z, and that becomes the pertinent state law from
that point on. Now, if the Circuit Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court must reverse the judgment of the district court, which correctly applied the applicable state decisions, and decide that
x-z, the federal courts are directly subject to every change of
decision in the state courts and become subordinate to those
courts. 27 If the state court can overrule its decisions while the
federal case is pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals, it can
do so again if the federal case should happen to reach the
Supreme Court on certiorari. 28 And if the federal case goes back
to the district court for retrial, as happened in the Vandenbark
case, the state court can again overrule itself. This same process
can be repeated during further appeals in the federal courts.
Under the Vandenbark case, the federal courts would be required
to set aside their judgments each time the state court overruled
itself, and tins kaleidoscopic process might go on endlessly and
29
ad nauseam.
^7 The course of litigation in the federal courts even on the question of state law cannot be analogized to the course of litigation in
the state courts on the same question. The lower state courts are, of
course, bound by intervening overruling decisions of the state's high-

est court or even an intermediate court of higher jurisdiction than
the court deciding the particular question. This is because the state

courts are part of an integrated system of courts, whereas the federal
courts are part of an equally integrated but nevertheless coordinate

system of courts having as much constitutional jurisdiction of state
questions as the state courts themselves possess. Consequently, their

judgment should not be subject to changes in the decisions of the

state courts, at least as a matter of compulsion. Moreover, as pointed
out in the text and in Note 25, supra, litigants in the lower state
courts which are bound by intervening overruling decisions of a

higher state court can always seek and often obtain a review of the
soundness of the overruling decision.
s Cf. Carpenter v. Wabash Railway, 309 U. S. 23 (1940)

In that

case a remedial amendment of the Bankruptcy Act enacted after a
decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals was held to require a reversal of the judgment.

" In the Vandenbark case the Supreme Court apparently limited

its effect to the period during which the federal case was sub 2udice.
The Court did not define this term. If it means only until a judg-

ment has been rendered, and until the time for further appeal has
expired, obvious injustices may result. A lower court, e. g., or the
Circuit Court of Appeals, may have rendered a judgment in accord
with a particular state decision. Although the time for appeal may
have expired, the court may still have control over the judgment
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It is, of course, no answer to such judicial gyrations to say,
as the Court did in the Vandenbark case, that we are "not insensible to possible complications" and that this jsticial kaleidoscope has never existed and cannot exist. The mere fact that the
Vandenbark case places the federal courts in a position where
they would be compelled to reverse, overrule, vacate and remstate judgments every time the state courts decide to change the
law of the state must give pause to all who have any sense of
judicial propriety and the stability of decision. Under such a
rule the judgment of a federal court becomes like a ship buffeted
about by the waves of state court decisions. This is not the characteristic of independent courts of coordinate jurisdiction. It
is the mark of dependence and servility
If the Rules of Decision Act compelled the federal courts to
submit to such justicial acrobatics, no fault could be found with
the Vandenbark decision. Criticism of the result would have to
be directed to Congress. But the Rules of Decision Act does not
compel this result, and, in fact, does not even "point the way to
a solution" 30 of the problem involved in the Vandenbark case.
The Rules of Decision section requires the federal courts to
during the term of court. During such term, and after the time for
appeal has expired, the state court may overrule its earlier decisions.
Should the federal court set aside a judgment based upon earlier
overruled state decisions? It is difficult to see why the federal court
should not do this if the Vandenbark case is sound. Nevertheless if
the case is sound, the instability of decision becomes even more
apparent.
Furthermore, it is the rule that a court has complete control over
its judgments during the term and that it may vacate or set them
aside in the exercise of its discretion. Suppose a court should refuse
to exercise its discretion to vacate its judgment because of a subsequent overruling state decision. Would that be deemed an abuse
of discretion? In other words, could the federal court be compelled
to exercise its discretion in a certain manner? It then ceases to be a
matter of discretion!
Again, a state court may overrule earlier decisions after the Circuit Court of Appeals has decided in accordance with prior state
decisions. In order to bring the federal judgment into harmony
with the subsequent state decisions, a litigant must bring a petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Certiorari, however, is a matter
of privilege and not of right. Why, in such a situation, should a litigant be compelled to rely upon the grace of the Supreme Court
rather than upon his rights which the Court in the Vandenbark case
held that he possessed? To be sure, in the Carpenter case, Note 28,
znfra, the Court did grant certiorari in view of the statutory amendment. But there is no guarantee of the Courts granting it every
time such a case is presented.
311 U. S. at 540.
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regard the laws of the several states as rules of decision only "in
the trials at common law." As we have seen, 3 ' the section does
not apply to admiralty, crmnnal cases or equity It applies only
to trials at common law. It was not intended to cover appeals,
writs of error and all the other supervisory writs. If the first
Congress in framing the first Judiciary Act and the Rules of
Decision section had intended that the section should govern the
action of federal appellate courts they could well have said so,
just as they might also have provided that it should apply to
equity They could have said that the laws of the several states
shall be regarded as rules of decision "in the trials at common
law and in any writ of error taken from a judgment rendered
therei," or something to that effect. But the section is singularly silent as to the effect of the laws of the several states on
writs of error and the like in federal appellate courts.
Obviously, it did not occur to the first Congress that the law
of the state might be changed 3 2 by decision after a trial at common law in the federal court and that the federal appellate courts
should then conform their decision in the case to the new state
law. And when it is remembered that the federal courts constitute a separate, integrated judiciary,33 it may be assumed that
Congress would probably have repudiated any such thought if
it had occurred to them. With all the evidence that we possess
as to the integrity and constitutional independence of the federal judiciary,3 4 it cannot be supposed that Congress would have
made the federal courts a shifting weathervane for the changing
winds of state decision. In fact, an abundance of evidence leads
to the conclusion that the framers of the Constitution, and therefore the first Congress, 35 mistrusted the state courts,3 6 particularly when they changed their decisions, and would probably
have disclaimed the necessity of giving effect to an overruling
state decision in a federal appeal if they had conceived the possibility of such a situation as occurred in the Vandenbark case.
The Rules of Decision section provides that federal courts,
n30 Ky. Law Journal 3, 11 et seq.
"Mr. Justice Story and the Court in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1
(1842), did not at that time regard state decisions as the law of the
state which the federal court was required to follow.
30 Ky. Law Journal 3, passim.
34Id.
Id. 6, 16.
Id. 40, especially Note 63.
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in trials at common law, shall be bound by the "laws of the several states." It does not require federal courts to follow the
dec2sons of state courts, but the laws of the states. In so far,
however, as a court decision establishes the law of the state, the
federal courts are, under the Erse case, bound by the decision.3 7
But does a court decision establish the state law within the intendment of the Rules of Decision section?
Court decisions are either declaratory or legislative in character. They either ferret out the law and declare it, or they
make the law. Perhaps, at times, they are both, or they may be
declaratory at one time and legislative at another. If decisions
were never overruled, we could say quite simply that it is unmaterial in what manner we analyze them for purposes of logic,
that is, whether we regard them as declaratory or legislative.
All decisions could be deemed declaratory and would be binding
upon the federal courts under the Rules of Decision Act. But
when we are confronted with the fact that there are overruling
decisions, the nature of decisions, that is, whether declaratory or
legislative, becomes a matter of prime importance and a pertinent subject of inquiry, since federal courts are not bound by
state decisions but by state laws.
If we say that decisions are declaratory, we face this paradox. The state supreme court in 1930 holds that x=y In 1940,
it overrules the earlier decision and holds that x=z. From 1930
to the decision in 1940, the law of the state is that x-y, and the
federal courts must abide by that law. In 1940, the state court
ascertains that it has erred in declaring the law, that x=y was
never in fact the law but that the law is and always has been
that x=z. From that point on, the federal court must hold that
x=z. But what about a clairvoyant federal court in the depressing decade from 1930 to 1940 2 Should it not be permitted
to hold that x=z 2 It is not bound by the decisions of the state
courts, but by the laws of the state. Certainly, in the absence of
any decision by the state court during that decade, the federal
court may hold that x=z. It is as competent to determine and
declare the law of the state as a nsz prus, intermediate or supreme court of the state; and, in fact, in view of the instability
17They are bound by state decisions by reason of the Rules of
Decision Act and its interpretation in the Erie case. As has been
observed in 30 Ky. Law Journal 3, there is no constitutional question
involved.
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of tenure of state courts and their more or less conscious attention to the next election, it is far more competent.38 And, if the
federal court can declare the state law in the absence of a state
decision, then obviously, under the Rules of Decision section, it
can, during the decade from 1930 to 1940, hold that x=z, since
when the state court overrules itself, the state law becomes x=z,
and the state court tells us that it has always been such. The
federal court must, therefore, even prior to 1940, hold that x=z;
for that is the law of the state which the federal court must
follow.
Suppose again that x=y when a diversity of citizenslup
case comes into the federal court. Before the court has rendered
a decision in the matter, it learns that the state supreme court
has granted certiorari or sometbing of the sort on a parallel set
of facts in order to test the soundness of its former decision that
x=y Must the federal court withhold its judgment until the
state court, perhaps a year later, has heard the parallel case and
Such a course
either affirmed or overruled its earlier decision
would lay the federal courts open to grave and merited censure.
It would make a mockery of the federal court's power to hear
and determine causes in diversity cases. It would render idle
the mandate of the Rules of Decision Act that it regard the law
of the state as its rule of decision, that is, in the normal course of
adjudication and without unreasonable delay
Again, suppose that under the West case, the law of the
state has been established by a decision of an intermediate state
court that x=y In a casual statement that hardly approaches
the dignity of dictum, the supreme court of the state mtimates
that x=z, without, however, disapproving or even referring to the
appellate decision. A parallel matter then comes into the federal court. Does the statement or dictum furmsh the convincing
evidence of state law, which, under the West case, would entitle
" Under the Erie case, when the law of the state is that x=y, the
federal court must hold that x=y. Under the Rules of Decision Act,
however, the federal court is bound to follow the law of the state and
not decisions of the state courts. Hence, if the state court subsequently
overrules its earlier decisions and determines that x=z and that the

law of the state always has been that x=z-prior to the overruling

of the state decisions, the federal court would under the Erie case be
bound to hold that x=y whereas under the Rules of Decision Act the
federal court is bound to hold that x=z in accordance with what the
state court subsequently finds the law of the state to be. See Stimson, Swift v. Tyson, What Remains? (1938) 24 Corn. L. Q. 54.
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the federal court to disregard the appellate decision 9 It would
seem so, since the state supreme court has gone out of its way to
indicate what it regards as the law of the state on a certain set
of facts. So the federal court holds that x-z. Subsequently,
the state supreme court repudiates its dictum and holds that
x-y If the federal case is pending on appeal, the judgment
would be reversed, and rightly so, because the Rules of Decision
Act requires the federal courts to abide by the law of the state
and not by dicta in decisions.
The uncertainty in which the federal court is placed by such
decisions as the West and Vandenbark cases makes it highly
improbable that Congress intended in the Rules of Decision section to require the federal courts to abide by every decision of
the state courts which purports to pronounce the law of the
state. It is equally improbable that the federal courts should
be compelled to change their judgment in accordance with each
change in decision made by the state courts. The question is not
whether in a particular instance a federal decision should be
corrected in order to conform to the applicable state law. The
question is whether the burden of hesitation, delay, uncertainty
and constant vacillation should be placed upon the federal
courts, or, at least, whether it was the intent of Congress to restrict their exercise of judicial power in this manner. 39
If decisions are legislative in character, there is even less
basis for the V1andenbark decision. Legislation is normally prospective where it affects substantive rights. If decisions were
frankly recognized as legislative, they would not affect judgments of courts even in an integrated system of courts in which
the decision in question was rendered.40 A fortiori, they would
have no effect upon the judgment of a coordinate but equally
integrated system of courts such as the federal courts. And, of
'As we have seen (Note 37, supra), the question is entirely one
of statutory construction or judicial policy rather than a constitutional question.
the Vandenbark case involved merely a remedial question,
there could be no objection to the application of an overruling state
decision to a judgment of the federal court. Cf. Carpenter v. Wabash
Railway (Note 28, supra). But even in purely remedial questions
some courts have refused, despite intervening overruling decisions,
to reverse judgments which were correct at the time they were
rendered. Gilday v. Smith Bros., 226 Mo. App. 1246, 50 S. W (2d)
191 (1932) In that case the court said "The prescience of the trial
judge is not his guide, but his duty and perogative is to declare the
existing law and administer it without regard to clairvoyance"
4If
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course, the same objections which have been made to the rule of
the Vandenbark case if decisions be deemed declaratory apply
with equal force to the effect of legislative decisions on federal
judgments.
Moreover, if decisions are legislative in character, the query
is pertinent whether the federal courts should abide by them
under any circumstance. Though courts do in fact legislate,
legislation by decision is an usurpation of power and indeed a
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. If the state
court erroneously assumes jurisdiction over a particular subject
matter over which it clearly has none, the federal courts are not
bound to recognize a judgment rendered in such case. Why
should they be compelled slavishly to abide by a not so erroneous but deliberate usurpation of the power and functions of the
legislature9 The answer is that Congress has not seen fit in
express language to provide that they should give slavish recognition to such usurpation.
CONFLICT OF LAws

In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 41 the court held
that in a case involving questions of conflict of laws, the federal
court must follow the rule of conflict of laws of the state in
which the federal court sits. Strictly speaking, the rule of this
case is merely an application of the doctrine of the Erse case,
and not an extension of it as in the other cases discussed above.
And, in general, it should be said that if the Erie case is sound,
its application to matters of conflict of laws is natural and
abundantly justified. If the federal court must hold that x=y
because in a suit between A and B the state courts have so held,
then it is difficult to find any ground for prescribing a different
rule of decision when the state courts have held that in matters
of conflict of laws the law of Q rather than R governs the relations of A and B. The rules of conflict of laws are, to a certain
extent, local rules of law. They may vary from state to state;
but within a state, they are part of its common or local law. A
commits a tort against B in state X. The state law governs their
legal rights, and the federal courts must follow it. If, then, A
commits a tort against B in state Y and the courts of X hold
- 313 U. S. 487 (1941)
498 (1941).

Accord: Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S.

EXTENSIONS OF ERIE CASE

that the law of Y governs as to the tort but the law of X as to
the statute of limitations, it is difficult, on purely logical grounds,
to discern why the federal courts should not regard this as the
law of X and the rule of decision in a parallel case.
Perhaps lstorically, there may be some basis for questioning
the application of the Erte case to matters of conflict of laws.
The rules of conflict of laws grow out of the law of nations and
principles of comity They are in reality not local rules at all.
In many systems of jurisprudence they are called private international law, to distinguish them from public international
law or what is truly the law of nations. If a contract is made in
X, to be performed in Y, the courts of X may hold that the law of
X, the place of execution, governs, while the courts of Y may
hold that the law of Y, the place of performance, governs. There
is no means of resolving the conflict of decision that may result
from this disparity of view. By hypothesis, principles of comity
do not help, since the courts of X and Y differ as to the
42
applicable law.
Such a matter then comes before the federal courts in X
and Y. Under the Klaxon case they must follow the laws of the
respective forums, and thus on the same state of facts, they
will reach diametrically opposed results. This is, of course, as
outrageous as it is absurd. Yet, under the Klaxon case no other
result is possible. Can it be that the first Congress in enacting
the Rules of Decision section contemplated this result or even
envisaged the difficulties that might arise out of the Klaxon
case?
There is an utter absence of evidence as to what the first
Congress intended with respect to the application of that section
to matters of conflict of laws. Bat there is some indication of
what the framers of the Constitution and their contemporaries
thought of these matters in relation to the powers conferred
upon the federal courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution.
Hamilton 43 infers that the framers of the Constitution
feared that the state courts would not apply the law of the place
of conduct in matters involving foreigners. Hence, he says, they
'Tlns problem is present in the McCoach case, note 41, znfra.

See discussion of the question in Cook, Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws (1942) 36 Il1. L. Rev. 493, 507 et seq.
The Federalist (Lodge ed. 1888) No. LXXX, 496.
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committed these matters to the federal judiciary Hamilton approves this provision of the Judiciary Article and categorizes
such matters as belonging to the "general law of nations," or
what in other systems of jurisprudence is called private international law. Hamilton even goes so far as to suggest that if
controversies involving foreigners had not been committed to
the federal judiciary and the state courts refused to apply the
lex locs m such matters, it might be deemed an aggression on the
foreigner's sovereign and a cause of war.4 4 He therefore infers
and suggests that the federal courts are not, in such controversies, bound by the pertinent state decisions but will apply their
own rules of conflict of laws, at least in cases involving foreigners.
Winthrop 45 states the common law rule of conflict of laws
to the effect that the law of the place where the contract is made
determines the legal relations of the parties growing out of the
contract. But he infers or assumes that the federal courts will
46
not regard themselves as bound by such rules.
This construction of the powers of the federal courts differs
in no wise from the view then generally held 47 of their powers

with respect to all the rules of the common law. But, for the
reasons assigned by Hamilton and Winthrop and, no doubt, by
many others, the rules of conflict of laws were singled out for
special remark, and the commitment of such matters to the independent determination of the federal courts was thought to be
especially noteworthy and commendable. Can there be any
doubt that the first Congress, composed as it was largely of
members of the Constitutional Convention, had tis distinction
between the ordinary common law and conflict of laws in mind
when they provided that the laws of the several states should
"Id.

"* *

*

But it is at least problematical, whether an

unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy

was wholly relative to the lex locz, would not, if unredressed, be an

aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulations of a treaty or the general law of nations."

I Letters of Agrippa, Massachusetts Gazette, December 11, 14,
1787.
"Winthrop says: "It is vam to tell us that a maxim of common
law required contracts to be determined by a law existing where the
contract was made; for it is also a maxim that the legislature has the
right to alter the common law." In the same passage he says: 'The
court is not bound to try it according to the local laws where the
controversies happen; for in that case it may as well be tried in the
must therefore be
state court. The rule which" is to govern
made by the court itself
,30 Ky. Law Journal 3, passim.
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govern the decisions of the federal courts?2 In other words, by
"laws of the several states," can it be doubted that they meant
purely local law, ordinary common law, and not private international law or what Hamilton called the general law of nations '
If that is so, then the Kaxon case extends the scope and intent
of the Rules of Decision section.
Nevertheless, in the ordinary conflict of laws case, the
decision is eminently sound as a question of judicial policy and
is in fact but a natural application of the doctrine of the Erie
case. But, it is submitted that when a conflict of decision might
or would result or has resulted from the action of the courts of
two states in applying different conflict of law rules to the same
set of facts, the federal court, whether sitting in the one forum
or the other, should be free either to resolve that conflict in
favor of the one view or the other, or to adopt still a third view
winch it may prefer. Certainly no objection can be made to the
federal court's adopting the latter course if once its right is
recogized to remain free and unfettered of the binding effect
of decisions of the courts of either forum. 48
CoNcLusIoN
The Erie case cannot be supported as a constitutional decision. But it can and perhaps should be justified on the ground
of judicial policy That policy is simply that judicial decision
shall not vary or vacillate because of the fortuity of diversity
of citizenship.
The subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court discussed in
this article purport to enforce and apply that doctrine. In fact,
they extend and distort it. The extensions raise many doubts
and possibilities that are entirely out of harmony with the very
policy which prompted the decision in the Erie case. In so far
as they raise these doubts and possibilities, they are unsupported and cannot be justified by either reason or authority
They are at variance with the judicial policy which purportedly
underlies them. And they place the federal courts in a position
of subordination and subserviency to the state courts in a man'8 Professor Cook, in a recent article, has advanced very cogent
arguments against the application of the Erie case to cases involving
questions of conflict of laws. Federal Courts and the Conflict of
Laws (1942) 36 IM. Law Rev. 493.
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ner which is within the intent of neither the Constitution nor
the Rules of Decision section.
In many situations, no doubt, these extensions of the Eze
case do in fact achieve the purpose of that decision. But the
result is based upon an assumption that the federal courts must
reach the results there pronounced. The cases rest upon determinations of the power of federal courts and not upon questions
of judicial policy In so far as they rely upon the Erie case,
they are-constitutional decisions, and therefore clearly erroneous.
The Vandenbark case dodges the constitutional issue and is
placed squarely upon the Rules of Decision section. The other
cases likewise rest upon that section in so far as the court held
in the Erw case that the section was merely declaratory of the
power of the federal courts under the Constitution.
The Rules of Decision section clearly does not cover the
situations presented in those cases. It requires the federal courts
to abide by the law of the several states. It does not impose
upon the federal courts the duty of abiding by every changing
decision of the state courts, and it does not direct them to heed
the reasoning and decision of any nisi prus or intermediate
court judge no matter how ill conceived and out of harmony
with what the law of the state really is. As the federal courts
are constitutional courts and as the Constitution is the expression of the will of the people of the several states, the federal
courts are as much an organ of the state through winch its law
is expressed as some vice-chancellor in New Jersey or district
appellate court in Ohio or California. Certainly the Rules of
Decision section does not deprive the federal courts of their
constitutional power, as an organ of the state, to determine the
law of the state in the same manner that it is determined by
state courts of first instance, intermediate courts and even courts
of last resort.49
In so far as the cases discussed in this article deprive the
federal courts of the power which they constitutionally possess,
' Professor Corbm has thoroughly examined the whole question
and in an article permeated with tinges of humor has reached substantially the same conclusions as are advanced in this article. The
Laws of the Several States (1941) 50 Yale Law Journal 762. In view

of Professor Corbm's article it might be thought an act of supererogation to present the instant article on the same question. However,
the writer of this article has sought to present the question from a
different angle and with different emphasis than Professor Corbin's

article.
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they are a distortion of the Rules of Decision section and the
broader judicial policy upon winch it is based. Hence, as decisions on the power of the courts under that section, they are
unsound. It is to be hoped that they will be reconsidered in the
light of further experience, and that the Supreme Court will
restore to the federal courts the dignity and prestige which they
have lost as a result of those decisions. Tis must inevitably
happen when the difficulties and objections to those decisions,
which we have pointed out, become realities.

